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Abstract—In this paper device-to-device (D2D) communication
is proposed as a tool for enhancing the services provided by
mobile cellular networks. The proposed approach is tailored to
mobile services with high bandwidth demands (e.g., real time
streaming services).
The technique we discuss relies on the cooperation among the
mobile users that participate in the service delivery process, under
the control of the base station. In particular, the paper proposes
an incentive mechanism encouraging terminals to organize into
an optimal number of clusters from the point of view of both
bandwidth capacity and power saving. The aspects inducing users
to collaborate are analyzed and modelled, e.g., the amount of
mobile battery power drained during collaboration, to better
design incentives to switch to D2D.
The proposed technique allows the base station to estimate the
incentives to grant to the mobile terminals to optimize its cost.
Through both analysis and simulations, we show that our scheme
achieves a significant gain in terms of costs while increasing the
bandwidth capacity of the whole cell.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-Device (D2D) communications have recently
attracted a large bunch of research as a promising approach
capable to enhance the standard cellular infrastructure, e.g.
3G and 4G networks, under several aspects such as improved
spectral efficiency, larger capacity and lower energy consump-
tion [1], [2], [3], [4]. According to the D2D paradigm mobile
terminals (MT) are required to behave as a part of a group in
which members in a good state help one another to achieve
the optimum state for the whole community.
In particular, it has been recently shown that D2D can
significantly boost the performance of group oriented services
[5], [6], e.g., bandwidth demanding multicast or broadcast
of multimedia. According to the taxonomy of D2D commu-
nications described in several works (e.g., [7]) we consider
outband controlled D2D communication where user terminals
are allowed to collaborate using unlicensed spectrum channels,
e.g., WiFi links, under the guidance of a central entity, i.e.,
the base station of the cellular infrastructure. By contributing
their own short range bandwidth capacities MTs can increase
the overall cell capacity while reducing the load on the base
station with resulting reduction of cost and power consumption
under certain circumstances.
Previous works [5], [6], [7] show that cooperation in this
kind of scenario leads to optimal outcome for the whole
community but do not analyze in detail many issues that may
arise on the user side. In fact, cooperation can appear as an
additional cost for the user because she/he can see her/his
battery operated terminal drain more power to support a cluster
of connected devices. So, what if any client is considered as a
selfish and rational player? Is cooperation still the best choice?
Our contribution
In this paper we consider a set of MTs covered by the
radio of a cellular base station and we assume that the users
have subscribed a pay-per-view service to receive a common
content, e.g., live streaming of a popular event. In this scenario,
we define proper mechanisms to incentive collaboration by
leveraging on the subscription costs. Several other papers have
shown that D2D strategies can be used to relieve the base
station task. This approach clearly amounts to shift some of
the efforts to the MTs that are charged by an extra task (the
relay service), hence increasing their energy consumption; such
issues related to the MT point of view have attracted limited
attention in the literature. The D2D-enhanced relay scheme
proposed in this paper tries to fill this gap. In particular, the
proposed analysis is centered on the MTs, on the incentive that
the base station must offer them to participate to the content
distribution, and on the relations between these issues and the
user battery state.
The main contributions of the paper are:
• the proposal of an incentive mechanism encouraging
terminals to organize into an optimal number of clus-
ters from the point of view of both bandwidth capacity
and power consumption;
• the consideration in the overall balance of hidden
terminal costs, e.g., the battery power drained for
altruistic collaboration.
We validate the model representing our incentive mecha-
nism against detailed simulation in both static and dynamic
scenarios. We then exploit the model analysis to quantify
the cost reduction of the BS thanks to energy savings and
the increased spare bandwidth that can be allocated to other
services. Furthermore, we observe that gains increase as the
BS incentivizes MTs to act as cluster heads for short periods
of time.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
related work is summarized, in Sect. III the problem that
we want to solve is defined precisely, Section IV defines
and analyzes the incentive mechanism we propose, Section V
validates the modeling approach and discusses some numerical
results. Finally, Section VI draws conclusions and outlines
future research lines.
II. RELATED WORK
There are many papers that focus on the use of D2D
communications in cellular networks. First of all we must
point out that while the classical cellular networks consist of
connections from the BSs to the MTs, the D2D communica-
tions introduce a two-tier architecture consisting of a macrocell
tier for the BS to MT communication, and a second device
tier for D2D communications. Such architectures combine the
classical cellular network architectures and features of ad-hoc
networks.
Several taxonomies of possible D2D architectures have
been proposed (e.g., [7]). In particular, according to the used
radio spectrum we can have D2D communications that occur
on cellular spectrum (i.e., in-band) or unlicensed spectrum (i.e.,
out-band). Concerning the out-band communications, the coor-
dination between radio interfaces is either controlled by the BS
(i.e, controlled) or by the MTs (i.e., autonomous). Most of the
research proposals that focus on in-band D2D communications
study the problem of interference mitigation between D2D and
cellular communications (e.g., [1], [2], [8], [9]). Concerning
out-band D2D communications, the research focuses on power
consumption (e.g., [3], [4]) and inter-technology architectural
design.
In this paper we restrict the attention on the D2D com-
munications controlled by operator where the cellular network
operator controls the communication process to provide better
user experience and make profit [8], [10]. In particular, we
consider how to efficiently use D2D communications for
enhancing the quality of wireless multicast services in cellular
networks. There are several other studies that address similar
issues, see for instance [11], [12], [13], [5], [6]. In these
papers several paradigms for multicast content delivery in LTE
systems based on the joint use of cellular and short-range
D2D communications have been proposed. All these proposals
point out the potentialities of the different approaches in
terms of energy consumption and of bandwidth resources.
Our research focusses on the same type of applications but
with a different viewpoint: the cooperation of the mobile
users. That is, the exploitation of the D2D communications
depends on the cooperation of the mobile users that must
help the BS in the content distribution process. A cooperative
mobile user consumes an extra amount of energy (e.g., the
energy to forward the contents to other mobile users by using
D2D communications) and this reduces its battery level. This
paper defines an incentive strategy to boost the mobile users
cooperation and a method to measure the effectiveness of the
D2D communications in the content delivery process with
respect the mobile user cooperative attitudes.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Description
We consider N mobile terminals (MTs) in the range of
a base station BS that subscribed a pay-per-view service to
receive a common content that is being transmitted by the
BS (e.g., the live streaming of a popular event). The MTs
are equipped with two wireless interfaces; a long range link
interface that is used to communicate with the base station
(e.g., 3G, 4G, LTE), and a short range link interface that can
be used to communicate directly with other MTs without the
brokerage of the base station (e.g., Wi-Fi Direct [14]).
In the absence of any strategy aiming at reducing energy
consumption and/or bandwidth optimization, all N MTs would
download the content over long range links that connect them
to the base station. In this case, the base station would stream
the complete content to each MTs that subscribed for it.
According to the taxonomy of D2D communication de-
scribed in several papers (e.g., [7]) in this paper we consider
outband controlled D2D communication. To this aim the MTs
can cooperate and forward among each other on short range
links the content that is received on long range links. As a
result, the MTs can reduce the amount of data circulating over
long range links targeting both a decrease in terms energy
consumption and an increase in the capacity of the base station.
In the following, we consider a generic model in which the
cellular network uses as long range links technologies such as
3G, 4G, or LTE, while the short range links adopt the Wi-
Fi Direct technology. The transmissions are done in unicast
on long range links whereas on the short range links multi-
cast is used. We assume that wireless multicast optimization
techniques (e.g., [15]) are deployed to increase the number of
receivers. An example of the system we study is depicted in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Illustrative example of D2D communication assisting
cellular content distribution
B. Energy consumption
In the following we assume that energy consumption is
solely determined by transmissions (we neglect the energy
consumption due to receptions). We only consider transmission
costs for the base station and we assume that this energy
consumption does not depend on the distance that divides it
from MTs; we denote by Etx,b2d the power consumption rate
(in W/Mbsp) needed by the BS to transmit (in unicast) to a
MT. Furthermore, we describe the energy available to MTs as
the normalized battery level x ∈ [0, 1] where x = 1 represents
a fully charged battery while x = 0 represents a completely
discharged battery.
C. User cooperation
The exploitation of the D2D communication is profitable
because it can increase the cell capacity and reduce the BS
power consumption at the same time. To achieve these goals
the BS must devise mechanisms to provide incentives to MTs
to organize themselves into clusters. In a cluster the so called
cluster head is the only MT that directly receives the stream
from the BS. A cluster head then forwards the stream to the
other MTs belonging to the same cluster (i.e., the cluster
participants).
In the following section we describe an incentive mecha-
nism that the BS (i.e., the mobile network operator) can use to
foster the MTs cooperation in the content distribution process.
In particular, we address two issues related with the BS goals:
i) the incentive mechanisms to encourage the MTs to organize
themselves into an ”appropriate” number of clusters, and ii) a
cooperation strategy between the BS and the MTs.
IV. THE D2D-ENHANCED RELAY SCHEME
Several other papers show that D2D communications can
be helpful to relieve the task of a BS. Although it is well
known that a MT that cooperates with the BS is charged by
an extra task (e.g., the relay service), and hence increases its
energy consumption, little attention has been paid to this issue
up to now.
Note we assume that the energy consumption required to
a MT for receiving the data via a short range links (i.e.,
throughout D2D communications) is lower than that needed to
receive the same amount of data via the long range link (i.e.,
via the BS). As a consequence, in our analysis, a (rational)
MT, if possible, would prefer joining a nearby cluster, and
then receive the content from the cluster head, instead of
downloading it via the long range link.
Assume that the battery level of a MT can be represented
by a continuous random variable X with values in [0, 1] with a
given probability density function f(x). Moreover, we denote
by xmin the minimum power level that the battery must have
to allow the MT of being cluster head for the time duration of
the relay period. That is, when a MT has a battery level lower
than xmin the MT’s energy is not sufficient for accepting this
task. Note that xmin depends on the power consumption rate
in charge to the MT for receiving over the long range link,
on the power consumption rate for forwarding the content via
D2D communication, and on the time duration of the relay
period.
A MT that serves as cluster head consumes an additional
quantity of its battery and hence without an appropriate
incentive, the MTs do not cooperate with the BS in the
content distribution process. In the following we develop our
analysis to determine an optimal strategy that the BS can use
to encourage the MTs cooperation.
The (monetary) incentives used by the BS should be a form
of payment that the BS recognizes to a cluster head MT for its
help (and hence for its the extra consumption). The incentive
could be a form of discount that the BS provides to the MT
for the current or the future services delivered by the BS.
Please note that it is difficult to convince a mobile user by
using considerations based on the cost of extra energy required
for being cluster head (see [16] for details). The definition of
appropriate incentives should be approached in terms of the
value that the help provided by a MT brings to the BS and
it should be a form of compensation for the decrease of the
battery level.
In the following we formulate the problem as a bargaining
problem between the BS and the MTs. Each MT has its own
minimum incentive that is willing to accept, and this minimum
depends on the battery level.
Let denote by m(x) the minimum incentive that a MT is
willing to accept (given a battery level X = x) for being cluster
head. The BS chooses an incentive b that is being offered to
the MTs. Each MT accepts, and hence it can assume the role
of cluster head, if b ≥ m(x). Note that the BS does not know
the MTs battery level but its knowledge can be summarized
only by the probability distribution of these values. From this it
follows that the BS can derive an estimation of the probability
that a MT is willing to accept for being cluster head as function
of b.
We assume that the minimum incentive that a MT is willing
to accept is a function of x defined in the interval [xmin, 1]; we
assume this function takes small value when the battery of MT
is fully charged increasing as x tends to xmin. Furthermore, to
define a such function we assume that m(1) = co, that is, co
is the minimum incentive that the a MT is willing to accept
when its battery is fully charged. A function that satisfies these
features can be defined as:
m(x) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1
(x− xmin)a λ for x ∈ (xmin, 1]
undefined elsewhere,
(1)
where λ = (1 − xmin)a · co, and a is a real number used
to increase/decrease the concavity of the function. Figure 2
depicts the function defined by Equation (1), with xmin = 0.3,
co = 0.1, and for three different values of a.
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Fig. 2: Function defined by Equation (1) for a = 0.5, 1, and
2.
Please note that the function defined by Equation (1) is
only one of the possible functions representing the minimum
incentive that a MT is willing to accept; other different
functions with the same behaviour in (xmin, 1] are plausible
and can be used to this end.
In the following we assume that the normalized battery
level is distributed according to a uniform random variable in
[0, 1] and then the minimum incentive that a MT is willing
to accept for being cluster head is a function of such random
variable. Nonetheless the following derivation does not depend
on the uniform assumption and can be extended to any other
probability distribution, if more accurate modeling of the
normalized battery level is available.
To determine the c.d.f. of the minimum incentive we must
account that the domains of the uniform random variable (i.e.,
[0, 1]) and of the function m(x) (i.e., (xmin, 1]) are not equal
and hence we must derive the conditional c.d.f. From this it
follows that if X = Unif [0, 1] we can define a conditional
random variable Y that represents the minimum that a MT
accepts for being cluster head whose conditional c.d.f. is
P(Y ≤ y|X > xmin). In particular, since the function m(x)
is monotone, we can apply the classical method to derive the
c.d.f. of a function of random variable, and hence
P(Y ≤ y|X > xmin) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if b < co
1− a
√
λ
y − xmin
1− xmin if b ≥ co,
(2)
where co is the minimum incentive a MT accepts when its
battery is fully charged. In Section V, to analyze the effects of
different distributions of the battery levels, we use a uniform
distribution in [l, u] (with l < xmin < u). To this end, we must
use a version of c.d.f. described in (2) that accounts for the
different interval [l, u] that can be written as
P(Y ≤ y|X > xmin) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if b < co
u− a
√
λ
y − xmin
u− l − xmin if b ≥ co.
(3)
From (2) we can derive the probability that a MT is willing
to accept of being cluster head if the offer of the BS is equal
to b:
pr(b) = P(Y ≤ b|X > xmin)(1 − xmin). (4)
The probability that exactly l MTs accept to become cluster
heads is binomially distributed and can thus be written as
pn(l, b) =
(
N
l
)
pr(b)
l · (1 − pr(b))N−l, (5)
yielding the average number of MT that accept to become
cluster heads nr(b) = pr(b)N .
Let us denote by Ad2d the area covered by a cluster head
multicasting the data received from the BS on the long range
link, and by Am2d the whole area covered by the BS. If
we assume there are l cluster heads we can approximate the
probability that a generic MT does not fall in the area covered
by the l cluster heads as
pu(l) =
(
1− Ad2d
Am2d
)l
. (6)
Equation (6) has been derived under the hypothesis that the
coordinates of the N MTs in the area covered by the BS are
described by uniform independent random variables. Accuracy
of approximation described by Equation (6) increases as the
ratio Ad2dAm2d → 0: in this case, the probability that a fraction of
the Ad2d area falls outside the Am2d area (this is the reason
why Equation (6) is an approximation) also approaches 0.
By combining Equation (5) and Equation (6) we can derive
the average number of MTs that are not covered by any cluster
head that is multicasting the data as
nu(b) =
N∑
l=0
(N − l) · pn(l, b) · pu(l). (7)
Note that in our content distribution scheme the MTs that are
not covered by any cluster head that is multicasting the data
are served by the BS over the long range link. We can derive
the average number of MTs that received the data via cluster
head MTs as
nc(b) = N − nr(b)− nu(b). (8)
The average cost in charge to the BS to serve the N MTs
(directly via long range link or indirectly via the D2D commu-
nications) can be computed by taking into account the energy
costs for sending the data on long range links (i.e., for the
nr(b) cluster heads, and for the nu(b) that are not served
by any cluster head) plus the incentives that it pays to the
cluster heads. In particular, if we denote by E tx,b2d the power
consumption rate for the BS (i.e., expressed in Watt/Mbps),
by vb the streaming bit rate, and by t the time duration of the
streaming service, the energy that the BS consumes to serve
the N MTs, directly via long range link or indirectly via the
cluster heads (i.e., D2D) can be derived as
EBS(b) = (nr(b) + nu(b)) · vb · t · Etx,b2d (in Watt · h)
To derive the costs in charge to the BS we must account for
two terms, one of which is related with EBS(b) while the
other one takes into account for the incentives paid to the
MTs (for being cluster heads). If we denote by d the energy
cost expressed in $/KWh (or in e/KWh) we can write the
BS costs (as a function of b) as
cBS(b) = d ·EBS(b) + b · nr(b). (9)
Note that average cost defined by Equation (9) is defined
as a linear combination of several terms derived from the
probability defined by Equation (4), and hence it is continuous
in R+ (as a function of b). From this it follows that we can
easily find the b∗ that minimizes it.
To ease reading, Table I summarizes the notation we used
in the paper.
V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to assess the ability of our algorithm to reduce
the BS costs, we perform a set of experiments, using the
mathematical derivations presented in Section IV and two
simulators that represents the studied system. A simplified
C++ discrete event simulator has been used for validating the
approximation we introduced (see Equation (5) and the issues
related with its characteristics). In this case we simulate static
Parameter Description
N Number of MTs that subscribed the service
b Incentive offered by the BS
d Energy cost
x Battery level for a generic M
xmin Minimum amount of battery needed to guarantee the cluster head
vb Streaming bit rate
t Streaming duration
pr(b) Probability that a MT accepts to become cluster head
pn(l, b) Probability that l MT accept to become cluster heads
Am2d Long range link covered area (BS’s coverage area)
Ad2d Short range link covered area
pu(l) Probability that a MT is not covered by any of the l cluster heads
nr(b) Average number of MTs that accept to become cluster head
nu(b) Average number of MTs that receive contents from the BS
nc(b) Average number of MTs that receive contents via D2D
Etx,b2d BS consumption rate to transmit over long range link
TABLE I: Used notation (defined for an area covered by a BS)
Parameter Value
Am2d 0.1256 (Kmq)
Ad2d 0.0063585 (Kmq)
N 100
Etx,b2d 14.65 (Watt/Mbps)
vb 1 (Mbps)
t 1 (hour)
d 0.2 (e/KWh)
co 0.1 (e)
TABLE II: Experimental settings
MTs randomly placed in a circle representing the BS service
area and for each BS offer b we count the number of MTs
that can accept to be cluster head and the number of MTs that
can switch to D2D. In particular this simulator, being based
on actual placement of MTs, does not use the approximation
yielded by Equation (6) to check if a given node cannot
participate to any cluster. Furthermore, we simulate the same
scenario with ns-3 [17] to evaluate the proposed technique in
more realistic settings that take into account user mobility. For
the definition of the scenario we study we use the parameters
listed in Table II
For the BS’s power consumption we use the LTE energy
model presented in [18]; with the parameters listed in Table II
one can derive the power consumption rate E tx,b2d = 14.65 (in
W/Mbps). Using the results on WiFi consumption presented
in [19] we estimate reasonable values for xmin, i.e., the
percentage of battery consumed by the MT to act as a cluster
head. Assuming a typical battery capacity of 1400 mAh and
using the Peukert’s law to approximate the drained charge we
get xmin = 0.34, when the cluster head relay period is one
hour long.
Figure 3 shows the BS’s costs cBS(b) as function of b.
We can observe that the value of the offer that that minimizes
BS’s cost is equal to b∗ = 0.176 when cBS(b∗) = 0.1375; if
one compares this value with the cost charged to the BS in
absence of D2D (obtained setting b = 0) cBS(0) = 0.2915,
it can be noted that D2D allows for a cost reduction of about
54 %.
A deeper insight into the D2D benefits can be noted in
Figure 4 that shows the number of MTs in the different roles,
i.e., cluster heads, cluster participants, and MTs that receive
the streaming from the BS without being cluster head. We can
observe that for b < co no MT accepts being cluster head
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Fig. 3: BS costs as function of b
and the BS station must provide the streaming service to all
the MTs . Furthermore, for optimal b∗ = 0.176 we have that
nr(b
∗) = 17.02, nu(b∗) = 28.45, and nc(b∗) = 54.5331. That
is, with the optimal offer 54.5 % of the streaming service is
supported by MTs collaboration. Figure 3 and Figure 4 allow
to point out the two perspectives of the D2D communication:
i) the cost reduction derived by energy savings, and ii) the BS
spare bandwidth (due to the reduced number of users being
served directly) that can be allocated to other services with an
overall increase of the BS capacity.
Furthermore, in Figure 4 we also superimpose to each
curve the corresponding estimates (using square, circle and
cross markers) obtained by simulation. It can be noted that the
simulation and analytical results are consistent.
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Fig. 4: MTs roles as function of the BS’s offer
Until now we have considered a scenario where the stream-
ing period and the relay period coincide (1 hour). In Figure 5
we consider a shorter relay period, i.e., we split the streaming
period into 4 relay intervals of 15 minutes each, and the BS
iterates the bargaining with the MTs in each round. Figure 5
compares the overall cost for 1 hour of streaming when t = 15
and t = 60 minutes, respectively. Since xmin = 0.09, and
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Fig. 5: Effects of different durations of the relay periods
xmin = 0.34 for t = 15 and t = 60 minutes respectively,
it follows that it is less costly for the BS to incentive a
MT to act as cluster head for a shorter period. Moreover the
number of MTs that can accept relaying is larger because the
required battery level is smaller. Nonetheless to compare the
two choices one has to look at the global cost for all the service
duration, e.g., 1 hour in our case, as done in Figure 5. These
results indicate a clear path: shorter relay periods yield better
performance. Obviously, this is an issue that must be carefully
addressed in future work taking into account the overhead due
to cluster management and handover.
In the next set of experiments we investigate the effect of
the battery level distribution. We must point out that, to the best
of our knowledge, there are no contributions in the literature
addressing this aspect. To show the effect of the battery level
we consider two uniform distributions with different average
values, one biased towards lower levels and the other towards
fully charged battery. In Figure 6 the BS’s cost is shown
as function of b for a battery distribution f(x) uniformly
distributed between (0.4, 0.8) and (0.6, 0.1), respectively. It
can be noted that our model is able to capture the positive effect
of more collaborative MTs in case of well charged devises, that
allow the BS to lower the optimal offer.
The analytical results (and also the simulative results
derived by using the C++ simple simulator) have been derived
in an ideal scenario that does not take into account for the
user mobility. To overcome this assumption and investigate the
impact of the user mobility we implement the same discrete
event simulator with ns-3. In the ns-3 model we study a system
with 35 MTs and analyze the performance of the D2D assisted
streaming system for a period of 15 minutes. Moreover, we
assume that the MTs follow a random walk mobility pattern
characterized by a speed in the range of 0− 2m/s (given that
the MTs are watching a streaming video a higher speed is not
very realistic). Figure 7 compares the average number of MTs
partecipating to D2D (cluster participants) computed by the
ns-3 simulator and by using Equation (8). We can see that in
presence of mobility the number cluster participants slightly
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decreases during the experiments with respect to the analytical
prediction. This can be explained with the fact that, during
a relay period, the cluster head moves potentially creating
uncovered areas that are not captured by the analytical model.
This issue can be limited by using shorter relay periods with
proper management of the cluster handover.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600  700  800  900
M
Ts
Seconds
Simulation n
_
c(b)Theoretical value
Fig. 7: Simulation result derived by using ns-3 (the plot
shows the average number of cluster participants and the 95%
confidence interval).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper we propose a D2D-based communication
communication strategy for collaborative content delivery in
mobile cellular networks suitable for services with high band-
width demands such as for instance streaming services. The
proposal is based on the cooperation of the mobile users that
collaborate with the base station by distributing the received
contents to other (neighbor) mobile terminals. This is the
basis of our proposal and it quite easy to figure out that in
a similar distribution scheme the base station reduces its load
by shifting a fraction of it on the mobile users that decide
to cooperate in the content distribution process. But it also
well known that for their collaborative behaviors these mobile
users incur in additional power consumption. From this it
follows that a crucial issue for a successful exploitation of
D2D communications concerns the incentive strategies that
the mobile network operator (via the base station) must use
to involve the mobile terminals in the content distribution
process. Moreover, the collaborative attitude of the mobile
terminals, that is, their propensity in incurring in a extra power
consumption, depends on their battery levels. In other words,
a mobile terminal with low battery level is more reluctant to
collaborate, and on the other hand when it has a fully charged
battery the collaborative attitude is higher.
The strategy presented in the paper allows the base station
to derive an incentive strategy based on a statistical knowledge
of the battery levels of the mobile terminals in its coverage
area. The strategy originates an optimization method that the
base station can use for deriving an estimate of the offer to
provide to the mobile terminals.
We validated the model representing our incentive mech-
anism against detailed simulation in both static and dynamic
scenarios. We then exploited the model analysis to quantify
the cost reduction of the BS thanks to energy savings and
the increased spare bandwidth that can be allocated to other
services. Interestingly, we observed that gains increase as the
BS incentivizes MTs to act as cluster heads for short periods
of time.
We must point out that in the proposed study there are
many issues that require further investigations. A non exhaus-
tive list of them includes the transposition of the proposed
theoretical framework into an implementable protocol. To this
aim we must define, for instance, a method to handle the
interference among D2D communications. We are tackling
this issue by using a method based on the interference graph
proposed in [20]. We are using this graph to determine
(dynamically) the mobile terminals that overlap their D2D
transmission areas. A possible protocol, under the base station
control, starts with the base station offer and collects all the
mobile terminals that accept it. In the next steps the base
station sequentially selects mobile terminals from the list of
those that accept the offer and give them the permission to
activate the D2D relay. A set of signalling messages from the
mobile terminals to the base station and vice-versa is used to
handle the interference and manage the activation/de-activation
of the D2D communication.
Other research directions are more oriented towards the
analytical side of the proposed scheme. In particular, we are
evaluating the effect of different distributions of the battery
levels, and the effects of other functions to represent the mobile
terminal behavior with respect to the base station offer and to
its battery level.
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